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INTRODUCTION
In 1967 the federal government assumed a key role in the
development and support of noncommercial broadcasting.
Recognizing the substantial benefits that Americans could derive
from adequately funded noncommercial television and radio
broadcasting, Congress joined the President in a commitment to
make the federal government a prime supporter of enlightening
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and entertaining programs, but decidedly different from those
offered by commercial stations.' The principal legislative vehicle
for this increased support was the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967
(Act).
2
Under the Act, both existing and new noncommercial stations
could qualify for grants from the Corporation for Public Broad-
casting (CPB),3 the entity established to receive and distribute
most of the federal appropriations for this activity. CPB was
expected to provide a large portion of the funds used to produce
programs and to establish interconnection facilities for qualified
entities rendering noncommercial broadcast services to the
public.'
Although local station independence and responsibilities were
legally protected, the federal government, through CPB, would be
able to influence programming generally by its decisions concern-
ing the purposes and qualifications for grants.' The federal
government's importance to the enterprise has exceeded its share
of the total cost of operating the system.'
Changes in the executive and legislative branches have
subjected the stream of federal funding to challenges and threats
that undercut creativity and some of the lofty goals of public
1. See GEORGE H. GIBSON, PUBLIC BROADCASTING: THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT, 1912-76, at 119-44 (1977).
2. Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 390-
399b (West 1991 & Supp. 1994)). Other direct support from the federal government has
been authorized in the Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-447,
76 Stat. 64 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-397 (1988)); the Educational
Broadcasting Facilities and Telecommunications Demonstrations Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-309, 90 Stat. 683 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-392a, 395, 397, 399 (1988)); and
Children's Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, §§ 201-203, 104 Stat. 996, 997-
98 (codified in part at 47 U.S.C. §§ 393a, 394 (Supp. 1H 1991)).
3. 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(g)(2), (k) (West 1991 & Supp. 1994).
4. See CARNEGIE COMM'N ON EDUC. TV, PUBLIC TELEVISION: A PROGRAM FOR
ACTION 68-79 (1967) [hereinafter CARNEGIE I].
5. 47 U.S.C. § 396(g) (1988).
6. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON PUBLIC TV, QUALITY TEm? 12
(1993) [hereinafter TWENTIETH CENTURY REPORT]. In 1990 the federal government
provided 16% of CPB's overall funding, compared to 19% contributed by state govern-
ments as a group. Id.
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broadcasting.7 In 1992 statements in Congress and the press
regarding proposed funding authorizations raised issues that will
demand more attention in the future.' Some political conservatives
argued that federal funding of public broadcasting is unnecessary
and inappropriate. They argued that such funding has been used
to support politically biased and, occasionally, indecent program-
ming. Some critics fault the system for being elitist, and for failing
to serve the diverse needs and interests of all Americans.9 The
system's failure to achieve diversity in employment is another
lingering irritant.
Although there are statutory provisions addressing most of
these issues-at least in general terms-a narrower and more
directed role for the federal government (via CPB) would
eliminate some of the perceived problems. Currently, federal funds
are used for a wide range of activities and facilities. Given the
variety of responsibilities imposed on CPB, and the substantial
costs associated with each such activity, reexamination of the
nature and limits of federal participation in public broadcasting is
appropriate.10
With nonfederal sources providing more than 80 percent of
the system's financial support,1' and with major portions of the
federal funding's being funneled directly to local stations for
general purposes,' 2 it appears that CPB could be required to
7. See Oscar G. Chase, Public Broadcasting and the Problem of Government
Influence: Towards a Legislative Solution, 9 U. MICH. J.L. REF, 62, 76-78 (1975); see
also WLLIAm E. PORTER, ASSAULT ON THE MEDIA: THE NIXON YEARS 145-54 (1976).
8. See, e.g., Walter Goodman, A Running Debate About Public TV, N.Y. TIMES,
May 18, 1992, at C18; John Wilner, Senate Spurns Freeze, Reauthorizes CPB, CURRENT,
June 8, 1992, at 1.
9. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REc. S7399-454, S7461-72 (daily ed. June 3, 1992);
Laurence Jarvik, Making Public Television Public, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER,
Jan. 18, 1992, at 1, 8-11; George F. Will, Who Would Kill Big Bird?, WASH. POST, Apr.
23, 1992, at A23.
10. See CARNEGIE COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING, A PUBLIC
TRUST (1979) [hereinafter CARNEGIE II]; TWENTIETH CENTURY REPORT, supra note 6.
Carnegie I and Twentieth Century Report are the two major studies of public
broadcasting completed since the enactment of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967.
11. Bill Carter, Conservatives Call for PBS to Go Private or Go Dark, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 1992, at Al, C15.
12. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(k)(3)(A) (West 1991 & Supp. 1994).
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restrict its program grants to services designed to serve children,
minorities, and other underserved groups. 3 By so restricting the
use of federal programming funds, CPB would have less reason to
be involved in questions regarding the use of nonfederal funds for
other creative and informational programming. The constitutional
issues raised by the 1992 authorization legislation would be
avoided. Nevertheless, all such programming would remain subject
to the standards of decency and fairness imposed on all public
broadcasters by local supporters, relevant statutes, 4 and imple-
menting regulations of the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC or Commission). 5 Further, clarification and enforcement
of station obligations regarding equal employment opportunities
would help the system achieve its stated objective of diversity. 6
Competing demands for federal funds will continue. Sugges-
tions that revenue be raised by levying taxes on the sale of radio
and television receivers or by imposing fees on spectrum use or
assignments, however, deserve new attention only if major
increases in federal contributions to public broadcasting are
contemplated. 17
I. BACKGROUND
For fifty years, beginning in 1917, noncommercial broad-
casters served the special interests of academic, religious and other
nonprofit institutions, and private groups. 8 These stations
operated without the benefit of network arrangements for access
to, and timely broadcast of, suitable programming. 9 While the
potential of over-the-air broadcasting as an educational and
cultural tool was well recognized, programming, interconnection,
13. See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 396(a)(6), (k)(1)(E), (k)(3)(B)(i), (m) (West 1991 & Supp.
1994).
14. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988) (prohibiting use of obscene language in
broadcasting).
15. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1988).
16. 47 U.S.C. § 390 (1988); see also 47 U.S.C. § 398(b) (1988).
17. See CARNEGIE I, supra note 4, at 8, 68-73; CARNEGI II, supra note 10, at 118-
27; TWENTIETH CENTURY REPORT, supra note 6, at 28-34.
18. See GIBSON, supra note 1, at 3.
19. See id. at 119.
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and national organization were underfinanced or nonexistent."
For the public to derive maximum benefits from the noble efforts
of pioneering educators and others, more federal attention and
support were needed.2"
Although too late to allot specific segments of the AM band
to noncommercial broadcasting,'2 the FCC did allocate portions
of the FM band and specific television channels for that pur-
pose.24 Thus, applicants for noncommercial FM and television
licenses were not required to compete with commercial interests
for frequency assignments, resulting in a substantial growth in the
number of noncommercial stations. Such expansion, led by
educational and community organizations, was further encouraged
by the Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962, which
authorized federal matching grants for the construction of
educational TV stations.' s
As more broadcasting facilities became available, the need for
programming that satisfied the missions of noncommercial
broadcasters grew more compelling. The use of the stations to
broadcast classical music, instructional programming, and local
cultural or community events fell far short of the aspirations of
Americans who sought a meaningful alternative to the entertaining,
but generally uninspiring, programs offered by commercial stations
or networks. To achieve the desired alternative programming,
larger sums of money were required. At this juncture, the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, already involved
in administering direct federal support to educational television,
sponsored a conference entitled National Conference on Long
Range Funding of Educational Television Stations, organized by
the National Association of Educational Broadcasters.2 Subse-
20. See id. at 88-92, 119-22.
21. See id. at 122.
22. Id. at 45.
23. Id. at 51-52.
24. Id. at 76-78.
25. Pub. L. No. 87-447, 76 Stat. 64 (1962) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 390-397 (1988)).
26. GIBSON, supra note 1, at 122-23.
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quently, actions by participants in that conference led to the
formation, in 1965, of the Carnegie Commission on Educational
Television. 7
In 1966 the Ford Foundation, responding to an FCC inquiry
regarding the domestic use of communications satellites, submitted
a dramatic proposal recommending the creation of a nonprofit
corporation to operate domestic satellite facilities for use by all
television broadcasters.28 Some of the savings derived from using
satellite facilities, rather than terrestrial facilities, would benefit
commercial broadcasters in the form of lower interconnection
rates. Another part of the savings would provide free interconnec-
tion services to noncommercial networks. Any excess would
support programming for educational television. 9 Although the
FCC did not adopt the Ford Foundation's proposal, it drew
important national attention to the potential of noncommercial
television and the substantial funding that would be needed to
realize that potential.
Notwithstanding the dominant position of educational
institutions in early noncommercial radio and television, the
concept of educational broadcasting was expanding.3" With
increased involvement of community groups, state and local
governments, and audiences, a broader vision of desirable
alternative programming was being adopted by interested leaders
and contributors.31
In short, many individual and group efforts culminated in the
January 1967 report issued by the Carnegie Commission, Public
Television: A Program for Action.32 The report contained recom-
mendations that looked toward the establishment of "a
well-financed and well-directed educational television system,
substantially larger and far more pervasive and effective than that
27. Id. at 123.
28. Id. at 120-22.
29. Id. at 121.
30. CARNEGIE I, supra note 4, at 21-22.
31. See id. at 23-24.
32. CARNEGIE I, supra note 4.
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which now exists in the United States. 33 The Carnegie Commis-
sion called for cooperation among federal, state, and local
authorities; n establishment of a Corporation for Public Television
to receive and disburse federal and private funds; 3 and congres-
sional support through authorizing legislation and appropria-
tions.3 6 The report also proposed a manufacturers' excise tax on
television sets to support the Corporation's television program-
ming,37 station facilities," interconnection facilities, 39 research
and development,n" technical experimentation,41 training,42 and
recruitment.4  The independent, nongovernment corporation
would protect the stations' creative and political freedoms from
federal interference; the public would obtain the real benefits of
national network arrangements, including ready access to programs
of broad interest.
The Carnegie Commission probably adopted the term "public
television '" in place of "educational television " to gain a
perceived public relations advantage and to avoid creating the
impression that the activity would be limited to instructional
television or formal education. Educational radio was effectively
ignored.
Whatever form and detail might eventually emerge from a
favorable congressional response to the Carnegie Commission's
report, it was clear that substantial financial contributions would
33. Id. at 3.
34. Id. at 33.
35. Id. at 36.
36. Id. at 36-37.
37. Id. at 8, 70.
38. Id. at 33-35.
39. Id. at 53-58.
40. Id. at 61-65.
41. Id. at 59-60.
42. Id. at 66-67.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1. As defined in the report, public television "includes all that is of human
interest and importance which is not at the moment appropriate or available for support
by advertising, and which is not arranged for formal instruction." Id.
45. Id. (explaining that "educational television" included "instructional television"
that was "directed at students" in some formal arrangement and "public television").
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be expected from the federal government.46 President Johnson
and Congress responded promptly with the Public Broadcasting
Act of 1967.47
II. THE PUBLIC BROADCASTING ACT OF 1967
The combination of the Johnson presidency's commitment to
improving American education, the receptiveness of Congress, the
sponsorship of the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Commission's
report, and the persuasiveness of several highly regarded educators
across the country created an opportunity for a major advance-
ment. The advance would change a growing number of loosely
allied educational television and radio stations into an intercon-
nected system of local noncommercial broadcast stations serving
a variety of public needs. The public would obtain access to
national and local programming that could be superior in many
ways to the lowest-common-denominator offerings of commercial
broadcasters. Using the 1967 Carnegie Commission report as a
base,48 the Administration submitted a proposal to Congress.49
The legislative result, the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, has
been amended several times since,5" but generally without
significant adverse impact on the public broadcasting enterprise.
Using an expansive definition of public radio and television
services and technologies, Congress declared that the growth and
development of these resources would be in the public interest and
that the federal government should assume a significant share of
the responsibility for such endeavors." Anticipated benefits
46. Id. at 68-69.
47. Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 390-
399b (West 1991 & Supp. 1994)).
48. See CARNEGIE II, supra note 10, at 36.
49. Kathy Gregolet, FCC v. League of Women Voters: Freedom of Public
Broadcasters to Editorialize, 39 U. MIAMI L. REv. 573, 576 n.23 (1985).
50. See, e.g., Public Telecommunications Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-626, § 6,
102 Stat. 3207, 3208 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.A. § 396 (West 1991 & Supp.
1994)); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1234(a), 95
Stat. 357, 736 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 396(g) (1988)); Public Telecommuni-
cations Financing Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-567, 92 Stat. 2405 (codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 390-397 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994)).
51. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(a) (West 1991 & Supp. 1994).
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included program "diversity and excellence" 2 and "programming
... that addresses the needs of unserved and underserved
audiences, particularly children and minorities. 53  Further,
Congress decided that a private corporation would be the proper
vehicle to distribute broad financial support to appropriate public
telecommunications entities.54 Since judgments would be neces-
sary concerning program content and the nature and location of
facilities, a private corporation would shield such decisions from
the political interference that might result if control of appropri-
ated funds were placed in the executive branch. Accordingly,
Congress authorized the establishment of CPB,55 and directed it
to "facilitate the full development of public telecommunications in
which programs of high quality, diversity, creativity, excellence,
and innovation ... will be made available to public telecommuni-
cations entities."56
In addition, Congress directed CPB to support the establish-
ment and development of interconnection systems and the
grouping of public telecommunications entities,57 exercising
minimum control of "program content or other activities."58 CPB
was authorized to use a rather full range of business means and
practices to carry out its mission. 9 The Corporation is prohibited,
however, from owning or operating any of the primary facilities
used in broadcasting, and it is not permitted to produce, dissemi-
nate, or schedule programs.6"
Although CPB is a private corporation, the President, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the members of the
Corporation's bipartisan board of directors to serve for limited,
staggered terms.6" Generally, meetings of the board and its
52. 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(5) (1988).
53. 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(6) (1988).
54. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(a)(10), (g)(2) (West 1991 & Supp. 1994).
55. 47 U.S.C. § 396(b) (1988).
56. 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (1988).
57. 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(B)-(C) (1988).
58. 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(D) (1988).
59. 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(2) (1988).
60. 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(3) (1988).
61. 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(c) (West 1991 & Supp. 1994).
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
committees are open to the public,6 and the Corporation's
financial management and records are subject to various public
reporting and auditing requirements."
Although federal contributions to public broadcasting via
CPB are based on a matching grant formula, the limitations on
such funding are currently determined by the amounts of federal
funds authorized and appropriated for specific fiscal years.'
Moreover, the allocations of such funds have been increasingly
controlled by legislative formulas and directions that have severely
narrowed the discretion of CPB. 6' The Act, with minor excep-
tions, protects the Corporation from interference or control by
federal departments or agencies, especially in matters affecting
program content or distribution of programs and services.6
Among the many detailed changes made in 1988, Congress
added a reporting requirement regarding the provision of services
to "minority and diverse audiences' 67 and the use of "radio and
television.., to help these underrepresented groups., 68 Targeted
groups included "racial and ethnic minorities, new immigrant
populations, people for whom English is a second language, and
adults who lack basic reading skills. 69 This obligation supple-
ments earlier equal employment opportunity provisions that
authorize and direct the Secretary of Health and Human Services
to prescribe and enforce rules applicable to most public broadcast-
ing entities.7"
Thus, in the first twenty-five years of public broadcasting, the
legislative scheme relied primarily on the interposition of aprivate
corporation and other organizational arrangements to preserve the
independence of public broadcasting entities and to promote
inclusiveness, rather than elitism, in the programs and activities of
62. 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(4) (1988).
63. 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(i) (West 1991 & Supp. 1994).
64. 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(k)(1)(B)-(C) (West 1991 & Supp. 1994).
65. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(k)(3) (West 1991 & Supp. 1994).
66. See 47 U.S.C. § 398(c) (1988).
67. 47 U.S.C. § 396(m)(1) (1988).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 47 U.S.C. § 398(b) (1988).
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those entities. Legislative and executive control of a significant
portion of the funding for public broadcasting, as well as federal
regulation of all broadcasting, however, leaves room for some
political influences to operate in the enterprise.
III. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO CURRENT ISSUES
Insofar as federal legislation is concerned, a serious challenge
to public broadcasting arose in 1991 when the Senate began
hearings on a bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1994,
1995, and 1996. Several conservative senators, encouraged by
other conservative public figures, argued that some programming
was nonobjective, unbalanced, indecent, or elitist, and that federal
funds should not be contributed thereto.71 Supporters of the
enterprise argued just as vigorously that the bulk of available
programming was informative, educational, objective, and
balanced.72 The supporters also argued that, in any event, the
choice of programs was subject to local control as contemplated
by the original legislation.73 The resulting legislation, enacted in
1992,' 4 incorporated compromises designed to mollify the
challengers, at least temporarily.7 5
An amendment of the Communications Act required the
Federal Communications Commission to prohibit both commercial
and noncommercial broadcasting of indecent programming during
71. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. S7399-454, S7461-72 (daily ed. June 3, 1992) (debate
on Public Telecommunications Act of 1991); Jarvik, supra note 9, at 3; Will, supra note
9, at A23.
72. See 138 CoNG. REC. S6034-36 (daily ed. May 5, 1992) (Sen. Timothy Wirth (D-
Colo.) inserting Sharon Percy Rockefeller, Big Bird: Someone Didn't Do His Homework,
WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 1992, at A15 (responding to Will, supra note 9), and Marshall
Turner, The Difference Is That Public TV Serves a Country, Not a Market, CURRENT,
Mar. 2, 1992, at 14).
73. Id.
74. Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-356, 106 Stat. 949
(codified at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 303b(a), 391, 393(b)(4), 396 (West Supp. 1994)).
75. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. S7471 (daily ed. June 3, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Robert Dole (R-Kan.)); id. at S7449 (statement of Sen. John H. Chafee (R-R.I.)); id. at
S7462-63 (statement of Sen. Daniel K. Inouye (D-Haw.)); id. at S7343 (statement of
Sen. Ted Stevens (R-Ark.)); 138 CONG. REc. S7304-05, S7330 (daily ed. June 2, 1992)
(statements of Sen. Daniel K. Inouye); id. at S7305 (statement of Sen. Ted Stevens).
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specified hours of the day.76 The amendment, however, did not
change the FCC's definition of indecency.77
With respect to objectivity and balance, the legislation
effectively gave CPB's board of directors the regulatory duties to
receive public comments,78 review "national public broadcasting
programming,"79 take necessary steps to facilitate objectivity and
balance, 0 "disseminate" information that would address CPB's
concerns, 81 and submit annual reports on the subject to the
President for transmittal to Congress.82 Further, under the heading
"Consumer Information," the legislation requires credits in public
television programs disclosing when CPB funding is involved.
When such credit is necessary, it must also disclose that CPB is
partially funded from federal tax revenues.8 3
The charge of elitism appears to have been addressed by new
emphasis on educational programming,84 services to underserved
audiences,85 and new requirements (backed only by certifications
and reports) that most stations comply with FCC equal employ-
ment opportunity regulations.86
The legislation assigned CPB two new initiatives. Finding
that "many of the Nation's children are not entering school 'ready
76. Public Telecommunications Act of 1992 § 16, 106 Stat. at 954. The Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit said in November 1993 that the time restriction was not
sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive constitutional scrutiny, although the court
acknowledged that the government had a compelling interest in protecting children from
indecency; however, the decision was vacated when the court granted a rehearing en
bane. Action for Children's TV v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated and reh 'g
granted en banc, No. 93-1092, 1994 WL 50415 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 1994).
77. The FCC defines indecency as "language that describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium,
sexual or excretory activities or organs." In re Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica
Found. Station WBAI (FM), N.Y., N.Y., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d
94, par. 12 (1975), quoted in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732 (1978).
78. Public Telecommunications Act of 1992 § 19(2)(A), 106 Stat. at 956.
79. Id. § 19(2)(B).
80. Id. § 19(2)(C).
81. Id. § 19(2)(D).
82. Id. § 19(3).
83. Id. § 20.
84. See id. §§ 17-18, 106 Stat. at 954-55.
85. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(k)(1)(E) (West Supp. 1994).
86. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(k)(1 1) (West Supp. 1994).
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to learn,"' 87 Congress directed CPB to propose the most effective
means to implement a "ready-to-learn" television channel. 8
Similarly, CPB was called upon to promote "distance learning
projects in rural areas" in order to "provide schools in rural areas
with advanced or specialized instruction not readily available."89
In essence, Congress chose to deal with difficult issues by
making minor adjustments, restating broad goals, and then
delegating the responsibility for achieving those goals to CPB-a
better-informed organization. CPB may well be in the best position
to undertake a few of these tasks, but there are good reasons to
question the constitutionality or feasibility of other very important
assignments.
Objectivity, balance, and diversity are words that evoke
visions of fairness and inclusiveness when implementation is
placed in the "right hands," (our own, or the hands of other
"right-thinking" individuals). Unfortunately, objectivity, balance,
and diversity are vague goals. Also, even though many positions
are labeled "conservative" or "liberal," disagreements abound
within those broad classifications. Beyond such simplistic
partisanship, there are numerous other overlapping or contradictory
positions to be considered. Although this country is governed
under a two-party system, other groups and special interests are
becoming more vocal; accordingly, fairness may be exceedingly
difficult to achieve. Fairness cannot be fully accommodated and
protected by an underfunded public broadcasting system that is
charged with responsibility for supporting a variety of noncontro-
versial presentations.
Perhaps more to the point, there are some serious conflicts
that cannot be avoided. Objectivity in a given controversy may
actually favor a particular protagonist. Balance in national
programming may be honestly perceived as unfair to audiences in
certain localities. Any attempt to impose national standards on
noncommercial radio and television licensees interferes with their
87. Public Telecommunications Act of 1992 § 17(a)(1), 106 Stat. at 954.
88. Id. § 17(b), 106 Stat at 955.
89. Id. § 18.
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rights and obligations to address the needs and interests of the
communities in which they operate.9"
Lacking statutory definitions of objectivity, balance, and
diversity, their meanings and influence on future programming
now depend largely on the ad hoc determinations of CPB91 and,
ultimately, on the strongest voices in Congress. Thus, it is entirely
possible that no clear standards will ever emerge or that interpreta-
tions will shift without notice as CPB's board members and staff
personnel change. On the other hand, if these key words were
understood to have the same meanings that they have acquired in
common usage, then one would be forced to return to the problem
of vague and inconsistent directions.
A. Objectivity and Balance
Can objectivity, the quality of being free from personal
feelings or prejudice, always be harmonized with balance, the state
of equilibrium? Certainly balance, as perceived by Congress,
suggests presentation of the significant sides in a controversy, not
simply the elimination of biased contentions. Nonetheless, balance
must be regarded as something less than "equal time." If equal
time were intended, Congress would have used the terminology
applicable to broadcasts by candidates for public offices, that is,
"equal opportunities"92 for other competing views of a controver-
sial subject. Objectivity, which relies on demonstrable facts, may
actually be one-sided; it may defeat an honest attempt to produce
a balanced presentation of important ideas, opinions, or prejudices.
Moreover, decisions regarding balance in programming, when
made by a national board, diminish local station independence, a
cherished privilege of all noncommercial and commercial station
licensees.9 As such balancing is done on a national basis, the
90. See 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1988) (prohibiting the FCC from censoring radio
communications).
91. Public Telecommunications Act § 19(2)(C)-(D), 106 Stat. at 956.
92. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988).




relevance of resulting programming to the needs and interests of
individual communities will likely suffer.
Apart from these basic incongruities, the responsibility of
CPB is to:
facilitate the full development ofpublic telecommunications in which
programs of high quality, diversity, creativity, excellence, and
innovation, which are obtained from diverse sources, will be made
available to public telecommunications entities, with strict adher-
ence to objectivity and balance in all programs or series of
programs of a controversial nature.94
This goal is multifaceted and may well exceed the reach of the
best-intentioned decisionmakers. In Accuracy in Media, Inc. v.
FCC,95 this language was described as "hortatory" 96-a congres-
sional charge to CPB, unenforceable by any government agency.
Because CPB and the public broadcasting enterprise are still
dependent on Congress for future authorizations and appropria-
tions, they must strive to minimize objections based on alleged
failures of the system to satisfy any of the ideals contained in the
quoted guideline or in any other part of the Public Broadcasting
Act that may receive congressional attention.97
In the Senate debate regarding the Public Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1992,98 several senators, by expressing very strong
objections to the content of some programs that the system had
broadcast, were able to negotiate an enhanced role for CPB
regarding content control in public broadcasting. Now, rather than
merely "facilitating" the idealistic legislative mission assigned to
public broadcasting,99 CPB is obliged to receive public comments
94. 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (1988) (emphasis added).
95. Accuracy in Media, 521 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934
(1976).
96. Id. at 297.
97. See CARNEMG I, supra note 4, at 36-37; CARNEGIE II, supra note 10, at 56-57;
cf Roeio de Lourdes Cordoba, To Air or Not to Err: The Threat of Conditioned Federal
Funds for Indecent Programming on Public Broadcasting, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 640
(1991); Craig Alford Masback, Independence v. Accountability: Correcting the Structural
Defects in the National Endowment for the Arts, 10 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 177, 200
(1992) (noting the difficulties faced by both the CPB and the NEA in balancing their
artistic ideals with their financial dependence on the federal government).
98. E.g., 138 CoNG. REC. S7399-454, S7461-72 (daily ed. June 3, 1992).
99. See 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (1988).
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on the system's performance.'0 0 Based on these comments and
its own review,101 CPB must "take such steps in awarding
programming grants ... [as] it finds necessary to meet the
Corporation's responsibility... including facilitating objectivity
and balance in programming of a controversial nature." 10 2 To
achieve this objective, CPB must engage in a form of jawbon-
ing"0 3 and report to Congress."°
By performing these functions, CPB has become a regulatory
arm of the federal government. Lamentably, this new regulatory
scheme is not limited to federally funded programming. It covers
all "national public broadcasting programming."'0 5
Though this legislative effort to assure neutrality in public
broadcasting may appear to be a justified constraint on the use of
tax revenues, the new regulatory scheme raises important constitu-
tional issues. By establishing CPB as the objectivity-and-balance
enforcement agent for the federal government, the nexus between
government and CPB is closer than ever. Assuming that CPB is
now a state actor, 1 6 its coercive powers over public broadcast
programming must be subjected to constitutional scrutiny under
the First Amendment.
10 7
Courts have ruled that Congress could not prohibit editorializ-
ing by public broadcasters,0 8 that public television licensees
could not be compelled to broadcast a particular program (previ-
ously scheduled and canceled),0 9 and that noncommercial
stations receiving federal assistance could not be required to
"retain an audio recording of each of its broadcasts of any
100. Public Telecommunications Act of 1992 § 19(2)(A), 106 Stat. at 956.
101. Id. § 19(2)(B).
102. Id. § 19(2)(C).
103. See id. § 19(2)(D).
104. Id. § 19(3).
105. Id. § 19(2)(B).
106. See Note, Freeing Public Broadcasting from Unconstitutional Restraints, 89
YALE L.J. 719, 724-27 (1980).
107. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984).
108. Id. at 398-99.
109. Muir v. Alabama Educ. TV Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1042 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1023 (1983).
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program in which any issue of public importance is dis-
cussed."11 Accordingly, when CPB threatens to deny or with-
hold program grants to pressure station licensees to present or
refrain from broadcasting particular programs or series of
programs, a conclusion that such coercion is unconstitutional
would be fully consistent with prior decisions in this arena.
If such control of public station licensees were required to
deal with controversial programs, whether or not such programs
were directly subsidized by CPB, the rationale for such control
would almost certainly apply to commercial licensees. The failure
to include all broadcasters in any such regulation raises equal
protection problems;"' however, if this new regulation were not
designed to protect radio and television audiences, then it would
qualify as an unconstitutional condition.
In these circumstances, CPB (or any other proponent of
CPB's added role as enforcer) must be prepared to justify this
exercise of coercive influence over programming not directly
funded by CPB. The Corporation must also be prepared to explain
why still-to-be-defined interpretations of objectivity, balance,
excellence, high quality, diversity, creativity, and innovation
should be applied to programming funded by a variety of
nonfederal sources, with or without federal assistance. If Congress
intends to support only balanced programming, then CPB's content
controls should be limited to federally funded programs. But if, as
it appears, the intention were to exercise control over any program
distributed or disseminated by any entity receiving federal funds
for public broadcasting purposes, consideration of the constitution-
ality of such control would be in order."'
Considering CPB's obligation to facilitate objectivity and
balance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in
Accuracy in Media, found such "hortatory" language to be
110. Community-Service Brdcst. of Mid-America, Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102, 1105
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
111. Id. at 1123.
112. See William C. Canby, The First Amendment and the States as Editor:
Implications for Public Broadcasting, 52 TEx. L. REV. 1123, 1152-53 (1974) (discussing
the overbreadth of an early prohibition on editorializing).
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unenforceable by the FCC." 3 However, the court noted that if
such language were intended to be enforceable, even by CPB,
constitutional issues would arise. 1 4 Acknowledging the limited
acceptance of content control approved by the Supreme Court in
CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,115 the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit noted that constitutional doubts "may
be raised on vagueness grounds. Such words may require 'all
persons to guess just what the law really means to cover, and fear
of a wrong guess inevitably leads people to forego' their First
Amendment rights."'116
Encouraging or facilitating objectivity by CPB's own funding
decisions may not violate anyone's First Amendment rights
provided such decisions do not affect unfunded activities of the
recipients. Precedent suggests, however, that the constitutional line
is crossed if a condition affecting freedom of speech is imposed
on the receipt of governmental benefits. In Rust v. Sullivan,
17
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the Supreme
Court, declared, "[O]ur 'unconstitutional conditions' cases involve
situations in which the government has placed a condition on the
receipt of the subsidy rather than on a particular program or
service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in
the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded
program."118
The 1992 legislation directed CPB's Board of Directors to
review the Corporation's existing efforts, solicit public comments,
and on the basis of such information, use its grant-making powers
and jawboning tactics to achieve the idealistic goals assigned to
113. Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. FCC, 521 F.2d 288, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976).
114. Id.
115. CBS, 412 U.S. 94, 119-21 (1973), cited in Accuracy in Media, 521 F.2d at 297
n.41.
116. Accuracy in Media, 521 F.2d at 297 n.41 (quoting Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 137 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting)).
117. Rust, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
118. Id. at 1774 (emphasis added).
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CPB 1 9 By that assignment of regulatory and supervisory
functions (to be implemented with as yet undetermined conditions)
CPB became a federal "agency" for the purpose of imposing
vaguely prescribed content controls on grants to public telecom-
munications entities. Presumably, whenever the system output fails
to achieve the desired objectivity and balance, CPB would be
expected to adjust or shift its emphasis, ever seeking ideal balance.
Even its new role as a righteous super-editor would not make CPB
immune from shifts of political balance as the CPB Board
membership changes or as congressional or popular interests and
trends vary. In truth, CPB has been given a political peacekeeping
assignment in public television and radio, armed with the power
to deny program grants to those entities that ignore its "con-
cerns."
120
In apparent disregard of the failed attempt to ban editorializ-
ing by noncommercial station licensees that received grants from
CPB," this new scheme may be a more insidious incursion on
the rights of those licensees. From a First Amendment point of
view, the latest effort to assure political neutrality in broadcast
programming runs counter to the experience of the FCC. The
Commission found that even the lower standards of fairness
contained in its Fairness Doctrine chilled, rather than facilitated,
free expression on controversial subjects.122
In a case arising from very similar congressional motiva-
tions,1 3 a U.S. district court examined a legislative attempt to
preclude the use of federal funds for artistic endeavors "which in
the judgment of the National Endowment for the Arts... may be
considered obscene." 124 To implement this statutory requirement,
119. See Public Telecommunications Act of 1992 § 19(2), 106 Stat. at 956 (referring
to goals set forth in 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (1988)).
120. Id. § 19(2)(D).
121. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
122. In re Inquiry into § 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules, Report and Order, 102
F.C.C.2d 143, para. 69 (1985) (proceeding terminated).
123. Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774 (C.D. Cal.
1991).
124. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No.
101-121, § 304(a), 103 Stat. 701, 741-42 (1989) (expired Sept. 30, 1990), quoted in
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the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) required its grantees
to certify that grants would be used in compliance with the terms
of the statute. 2 The court found that notwithstanding NEA's
stated intention to use the well-established definition of obscenity
found in Miller v. California,2 6 the "certification requirement is
unconstitutionally vague because it leaves the determination of
obscenity in the hands of NEA." 127 Furthermore, the court held
that such vagueness would "cause a chilling effect in violation of
the First Amendment. The facts ... go well beyond a simple
decision not to subsidize obscene speech., 128 In rejecting "the
government's defense, that its certification requirement is merely
part of a subsidy decision 129 that leaves the artist free to seek
funding from other sources, the court found that NEA's grant
decisions do affect an artist's ability to obtain private support and
that a denial is "the type of obstacle in the path of the exercise of
fundamental speech rights that the Constitution will not toler-
ate."13 From motivation to implementation, the parallelism of
the NEA's certification requirement and the new CPB objectivity-
and-balance conditions is evident.
Congress's vague directions authorize CPB directors,
including some broadcast entity representatives' (whose inter-
ests may conflict with the interests of other potential grant
recipients) to define, judge, and reward or penalize applicants.132
Such authorization could be seen as an unlawful delegation of
Bella Lewitzky Dance Found., 754 F. Supp. at 776.
125. Bella Lewitzky Dance Found., 754 F. Supp. at 776.
126. Miller, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The test for determining obscenity is "(a)
whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find
that the work, taken as whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (c) whether, the work, taken as whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. (citations omitted).
127. Bella Lewitzky Dance Found., 754 F. Supp. at 781-82.
128. Id. at 785.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See 47 U.S.C. § 396(c)(3) (1988).




legislative power.13 3 Although the ends-quality, excellence,
balance, objectivity, and diversity-may be justified, the means
must be reconsidered with more attention to the constitutional
issues raised by the 1992 legislation.
Assuming that a court could find that the threat of withhold-
ing federal funds is not coercive and that the new scheme is
merely demonstrative of the importance that Congress attaches to
its own goal of fairness, the interested parties must recognize the
chilling effect on all active participants. In the current statutory
environment, the safest course for CPB or any other entity wanting
to ensure a continual flow of federal funds to public broadcasting
will be to avoid controversial subjects.134 That consequence will
not serve the public, the ultimate beneficiaries of First Amendment
protections relevant to this enterprise. Seeking to promote fairness
in the output of a system that is entitled to a large measure of
freedom of expression, Congress's latest adjustment encroaches on
the rights of the operators and users of public television and radio
facilities.
Beyond any problem raised by the aforementioned constitu-
tional issues, the wisdom of transferring responsibility for
judgments regarding quality and fairness from local station
licensees to nine or ten135 politically appointed CPB directors is
dubious. Certainly, CPB can make some important contributions
to a viable, inclusive system of noncommercial broadcasting, and
these contributions should meet the highest achievable standards
of quality, diversity, and fairness. By focusing CPB's program-
ming efforts on its own output and by directing its attention to
subjects inadequately addressed by nonfederal sources, government
funding could be used more effectively to fill gaps left by other
133. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310-12 (1936); cf Louis L. Jaffe,
Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 204-06 (1937) (asserting that
government is not allowed to grant industry authority to regulate wages).
134. Cf Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (applying due process to
prevent chilling effect on speech created by state requirement that to receive tax
exemption taxpayer must prove nonadvocacy of governmental overthrow).
135. 47 U.S.C. § 396(c)(1)-(2) (1988), amended by Public Telecommunications Act
of 1992 § 5(a), 106 Stat. at 949-50.
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contributors to the enterprise. The pursuit of excellence, balance,
objectivity, and diversity in federally funded interstitial program-
ming, for example, would be well within CPB's province.
Since the 1992 legislation already includes tentative,
commendable steps in this direction,136 Congress's only remain-
ing task is to require CPB to explore other possible uses of
television and radio facilities to address unmet needs. Assuming
that government funding of telecommunications services is not
intended to be competitive with commercial services,'37 Con-
gress should direct CPB to be creative, innovative, and specific in
using federal funds for truly noncommercial programming.
While public broadcasting has been expected to serve a
variety of instructional, educational, and cultural interests,
typically with programming that is not commercially viable,
important subjects in the noncommercial arena have not attracted
much financial support from traditional donors. Corporate and
individual sources favor programs that appeal to those most able
to contribute. State and other local government resources-much
needed for continued operation of many stations-are generally
insufficient for the production of national programming, particu-
larly the kind of programming that is unlikely to generate
significant private support. The resulting void can best be filled
with the aid of federal funding.
Some have suggested that Congress let the nonfederal funding
(more than 80 percent of the total), and that portion of federal
funding now allocated to general purposes of qualifying sta-
tions,138 be used for the general activities (including program-
ming) of noncommercial stations. Such stations would, of course,
remain subject to reasonable federal regulation by the FCC, not to
mention the nonconflicting local controls or influences extant in
their communities. Final editorial decisions regarding quality,
diversity, objectivity, and balance should be made by the licensees.
136. See Public Telecommunications Act of 1992 §§ 17-18, 106 Stat. at 954-55
(proposing education projects to benefit preschool and rural area children).
137. 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(5) (1988).
138. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(k)(3)(A)(ii)-(iii)(II) (West 1991 & Supp. 1994).
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CPB, acting for the federal government or as a trustee of public
money, should facilitate and encourage efforts to achieve these
idealistic goals through public reports on the successes and failures
of specific programs or series of programs. To whatever extent
CPB participates in the funding of programs, such productions
should fill significant gaps in broadcast services available to the
public. CPB grants should promote "telecommunications services
... which will constitute an expression of diversity and excellence
... [and] encourage the development of programming that
involves creative risks and that addresses the needs of unserved
and underserved audiences.,
139
Much of the justification for federal funding of public
broadcasting comes from the continuing failure of commercial
broadcasting to address adequately the above-mentioned critical
needs with enlightening and uplifting (as well as entertaining)
programs. Regrettably, this underfunded system-surviving with
meager federal support-has had to rely largely on repeat
presentations of its most popular programs in order to garner
audience support. Survival of public broadcasting may even
depend on the syndication of popular programs to commercial
stations and the crossover of commercial network shows to public
broadcasting.
1 40
As we watch and listen, the vision of "alternative telecommu-
nications services" is fading. Much more than expressions of
dissatisfaction with particular programs and claims of political
imbalance is necessary. If federal funding is going to continue at
current low levels, Congress (with CPB assistance) should identify
the unmet needs of underserved audiences and require CPB to
contract for programming that will serve those needs. That
programming should be offered first to noncommercial stations
and networks without charge, and second to commercial stations
for reasonable charges.
139. 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(5)-(6) (1988) (emphasis added).
140. See Elizabeth Kolbert, For Some Public TV Programs, Syndication to
Commercial Stations May Mean Survival, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 16, 1993, at D7.
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Although the drift toward commercialization of public
broadcasting raises other serious policy questions, the legitimate
concerns regarding balance, objectivity, quality, and diversity are
also applicable to commercial broadcasting, cable, and other
media. Let the government lead by good example, not by coercive
conditions. The role of CPB should be positive, uplifting, and
broadening, particularly for audiences that lack economic power
or political muscle necessary to command attention to their unique
requirements. Let the local communities and underwriters of other
programming guide the station licensees in their selection of
programs designed to serve more general interests.
B. Program Diversity
Although another public broadcasting goal is diversity,
"elitism" is a recurring complaint leveled at the programs
emanating from public television and radio."' This charge finds
support in the patent efforts of public broadcasters to please
contributors who, taken as a group, are probably not representative
of the overall audience. It is quite reasonable for financially
strapped stations to present and repeat programs that are favored
by the largest contributors. Another possible reason for the
apparent bias toward "high-brow" programming is that many
stations are sponsored by universities and similar institutions that
have special obligations to serve the interests of their well-
educated constituents. Such uses of the medium are not inappropri-
ate in a system intended to meet the special needs of limited,
underserved audiences. Unfortunately, the overriding problem of
scarce funding also drives program directors to rely heavily on
relatively inexpensive use of prerecorded material and foreign
productions.
141. See, e.g., George F. Will, $1.1 Billion for Public TV?., WASH. POST, May 12,
1992, at A19 (arguing that public television benefits "an economically and intellectually
advantaged constituency"); see also Walter Goodman, A Running Debate About Public
TV, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1992, at C18.
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In the interest of services to limited audiences, the system
should not be faulted for its selection of high-quality, inexpensive
productions. Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that program
variety and innovation have suffered. Rather than curse the good
productions that attract the viewers most likely to support their
local stations, a way should be found to increase program diversity
and to assure that less fortunate or neglected segments of the
public also receive excellent, enlightening broadcast services.
C. Diversity in Employment
If the goals of diversity, creativity, and innovation are to
encompass more than partisan political issues, the system should
be offering "alternative telecommunications services for all the
citizens"' 42-- promoting educational values and opportunities and
providing information about the peoples and cultures of the United
States and other parts of the world. The access to, and understand-
ing of, such information benefits from a diversity of human
resources. Thus, added to the usual considerations of equal
employment opportunities, public broadcasting has a special
obligation to diversify its production, reporting, and editing
personnel. Diverse human resources are essential to achieving the
idealistic goals set for this enterprise.
In the 1992 legislation, Congress sent another signal of its
desire to promote equal employment opportunities by requiring
certification of station compliance with relevant FCC regulations,
plus detailed reports thereon to CPB and by CPB to Congress. 4 3
This new requirement, in addition to preexisting equal opportunity
employment provisions,1" should finally cause all public broad-
casting entities to appreciate the importance of diversity to the
future of public radio and television.
Performance, to date, by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services and her predecessors of their assignment to enforce the
equal employment opportunities provisions can only be found
142. 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(5) (1988).
143. 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(k)(1 1)(A)-(C), (m)(2) (West Supp. 1994).
144. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(m) (West 1991 & Supp. 1994).
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wanting. Near complete neglect of the statutory directions14 to
the Secretary has marked the last fifteen years. Current incentives,
including a rapid increase in the diversity of the U.S. population,
could foster more attention to diversity in programming and
personnel. Moreover, adoption of the proposal herein, which
would direct more attention to services that address "the needs of
unserved and underserved audiences" '146 would also prompt
greater attention to the need for diversification of talent in the
future.
D. Source of Federal Funds
When the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television
considered possible sources of federal funding for public televi-
sion, it proposed a manufacturer's excise tax on television sets,
with revenues made available through a trust fund for the
proposed Corporation for Public Television. 47 This financing
mechanism was designed to distance the activity from political
control and to "permit the funds to be disbursed outside the usual
budgeting and appropriation procedures."' 48 Instead, Congress
chose to use general tax revenues and traditional authorization and
appropriation procedures. 49
A variety of federal funding source proposals have been
advanced, 5 ' most of which seek to insulate the sources from
programming judgments. In addition to, or in place of, appropria-
tions from general tax revenues, proposed revenue sources include
taxes on profitable commercial communications entities and taxes
on assignments and transfers of broadcast licenses. Granting tax
credits to donors might be a fruitful means of increasing audience
and underwriter support. Spectrum use fees or a share of revenues
145. See 47 U.S.C. § 398(b) (1988).
146. 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(6) (1988).
147. CARNEGIE I, supra note 4, at 8, 70.
148. Id. at 69.
149. 47 U.S.C.A. § 396(k)(1) (West 1991 & Supp. 1994).
150. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON LONG-RANGE FINANCING FOR PUBLIC BROADCAST-
ING, REPORT (1983); CARNEGIE II, supra note 10, at 139-45; TWENTIETH CENTURY
REPORT, supra note 6, at 28-32, 34.
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derived from anticipated auctions of upcoming spectrum assign-
ments would avoid the need for traditional taxes by requiring
spectrum users to pay for the valuable resources they obtain from
the government.
Dedicating these taxes or fees to funding public broadcasting
could be justified in light of the benefits returned to the public by
the system. But each proposal has disadvantages. Spectrum use
fees and taxes on particular communications enterprises or
activities may unfairly place the entire federal funding burden on
selected taxpaying groups. Tax credits favor those who support the
enterprise while penalizing those who must cover any resulting
revenue deficiencies affecting other areas. Any new taxes or fees
could reduce voluntary contributions without assurance of greater
independence for the system. Money, though, is rarely provided
without important conditions. In the end, the use of general tax
revenues, based primarily on a progressive income tax system,
seems most compatible with the purposes of the system. In other
words, grants that support a system of local stations serving all
areas in the nation and program grants designed to meet the needs
of underserved audiences should be favored.
Absent a new consensus that public broadcasting should be
given very large increases in federal funding to achieve much
more of its potential, the current means of financing a gap-filling
public service is satisfactory. It encourages the general public to
express its concern and to be heard regarding national program-
ming. Assuming that station licensees' First Amendment rights
continue to receive court protection, and that contributors,
underwriters, and local communities exercise their prerogatives
with respect to the major portions of the total funding that they
provide, no correction of the federal funding mechanism is
necessary. Presumably, complaints (regarding alleged nonobjective
or imbalanced treatment of controversial subjects, indecency,
elitism, or lack of diversity in programming) reflect the opinions
of citizens with rights to communicate with their elected represen-
tatives, who would bear ultimate responsibility for any unwise
allocation of tax revenues. Certainly, if the political branches act
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irresponsibly on this subject, the problem will not be limited to the
relatively small sums being appropriated for public broadcasting.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Concerns regarding objectivity and balance in public
television and radio programs financed by nonfederal funds should
not influence CPB grant decisions related to specific programs.
Although commercial and noncommercial programming should be
considered in federal (CPB) choices regarding types of activities
or programs that need federal support, Congress should repeal that
portion of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1992 that uses grant
powers and jawboning tactics to control national public broadcast
programming without regard to the funding sources. 5 '
CPB grants for national programming should be used to fill
gaps in the services offered by public broadcasting entities. Special
attention should be paid to the needs of underserved audiences,
particularly children and minorities. In other words, CPB should
forego participation in the more popular, underwritten, audience-
supported programs in order to experiment and lead in the creation
of diverse services that are worthy alternatives to other noncom-
mercial, as well as commercial, productions.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services should fulfill
her obligations to delineate and enforce the equal employment
opportunity provisions of the Act. Such action should foster both
program diversity and fair employment practices in entities
receiving federal funds for operations or programming.
CONCLUSION
In the 1992 legislation relating to public broadcasting,
Congress unwisely directed CPB to trespass on the constitutional
rights of public station licensees by instructing CPB to define and
enforce notions of quality, objectivity, and balance by effectively
conditioning grants on satisfactory responses to CPB's "con-
151. Public Telecommunications Act of 1992 § 19(2)(C)-(D), 106 Stat. at 956.
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cerns."' 2 A better plan would be to authorize CPB to identify
and fund activities and services that will benefit underserved
audiences, leaving questions of political objectivity and balance to
the local station licensees, who are subject to the control of their
constituencies.
After twenty-five years, public broadcasting does not need to
be saddled with a federal bureaucratization of editorial
decisionmaking that is already subject to FCC regulation and local
community influence. Federal funding and leadership are most
needed for advancing highly desirable projects that are least likely
to be tackled by financially insecure, noncommercial broadcast
entities.
152. Undoubtedly, Congress anticipates future CPB "concerns" to be reflective of the
concerns voiced by key members of Congress.
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